【报告人简介】

王大中，南京大学经济学院助理教授，经济学博士、管理学博士后。博士毕业于上海财经大学。研究领域涵盖互联网与数字经济、创新经济学、机制设计等。曾在《经济研究》、《管理科学学报》、《金融研究》、Journal of Mathematical Economics, Social Choice and Welfare, Economics Letters, Mathematical Social Sciences, Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design 等国内外重要学术刊物发表文章，被中国社会科学文摘、人大复印报刊资料等转载。主持国家自然科学基金（青年项目）、教育部人文社会科学研究青年项目等国家及省部级课题多项。

【内容摘要】

In the platform economy, positions are very important network resources. Thus, how to effectively allocate positions is an important issue to promote sustainable development of platform economy. From the perspective of platform’s revenue maximization, this paper studies the choice of auction payment method. First, based on the generalized second price auction mechanism (GSP mechanism) which is widely used in practice, this paper analyzes the seller's equilibrium bidding strategies under “pay-per-click” (PPC), “payment per transaction with fixed payment” (PPTF), and “pay per transaction with revenue-sharing” (PPTS), respectively. Then compares these three payment methods in terms of three criteria: expected revenue of platform, expected payoff of the sellers, as well as the allocative efficiency. It shows that the PPTS brings the highest expected revenue to the platform, followed by the PPTF and then is the PPC. In terms of the seller’s expected payoff, the PPC yields the most, and then is the PPTF, while the PPTS generate the least. When it comes to allocative efficiency, both the PPTF and the PPTS are more efficient than the PPC. This study could provide theoretical reference for the design of position auction mechanism in platform economy.

【参会方式】

腾讯会议  会议ID：169 922 724

方式一：下载“腾讯会议”客户端，输入“会议ID”加入会议

方式二：点击参会链接加入会议

https://meeting.tencent.com/dm/VfRguCvGMhfE

【更多信息】

获取更多信息，请扫描下方二维码加入“IAER Seminar”腾讯QQ群（群号：904 544 292）或微信群，可同时关注高等经济研究院网站：http://iaer.dufe.edu.cn。

撰稿：高姝涵 审核：齐鹰飞 单位：高等经济研究院